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We formalize Byzantine linearizability, a correctness condition that specifies whether a concurrent
object with a sequential specification is resilient against Byzantine failures. Using this definition, we
systematically study Byzantine-tolerant emulations of various objects from registers. We focus on
three useful objects– reliable broadcast, atomic snapshot, and asset transfer. We prove that there
exist n-process f -resilient Byzantine linearizable implementations of such objects from registers if
and only if f < n2 .
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, cryptocurrencies have taken the world by storm. The idea of a decen-
tralized bank, independent of personal motives has gained momentum, and cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin [23], Ethereum [25], and Diem [8] now play a big part in the world’s economy.
At the core of most of these currencies lies the asset transfer problem. In this problem, there
are multiple accounts, operated by processes that wish to transfer assets between accounts.
This environment raises the need to tolerate the malicious behavior of processes that wish to
sabotage the system.
In this work, we consider the shared memory model that was somewhat neglected in
the Byzantine discussion. We believe that shared memory abstractions, implemented in
distributed settings, allow for an intuitive formulation of the services offered by blockchains
and similar decentralized tools. It is well-known that it is possible to implement reliable
read-write shared memory registers via message passing even if a fraction of the servers are
Byzantine [1, 21, 24, 19]. As a result, as long as the client processes using the service are
not malicious, any fault-tolerant object that can be constructed using registers can also be
implemented in the presence of Byzantine servers. However, it is not clear what can be done
with such objects when they are used by Byzantine client processes. In this work, we study
this question.
In Section 4 we define Byzantine linearizability, a correctness condition applicable to any
shared memory object with a sequential specification. Byzantine linearizability addresses
the usage of reliable shared memory abstractions by potentially Byzantine client processes.
We then systematically study the feasibility of implementing various Byzantine linearizable
shared memory objects from registers.
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We observe that existing Byzantine fault-tolerant shared memory constructions [20, 22, 1]
in fact implement Byzantine linearizable registers. Such registers are the starting point of our
study. When trying to implement more complex objects (e.g., snapshots and asset transfer)
using registers, constructions that work in the crash-failure model no longer work when
Byzantine processes are involved, and new algorithms – or impossibility results – are needed.
As our first result, we prove in Section 5 that an asset transfer object used by Byzantine
client processes does not have a wait-free implementation, even when its API is reduced
to support only transfer operations (without reading processes’ balances). Furthermore, it
cannot be implemented without a majority of correct processes constantly taking steps. Asset
transfer has wait-free implementations from both reliable broadcast [7] and snapshots [17]
(which we adapt to a Byzantine version) and thus the same lower bound applies to reliable
broadcast and snapshots as well.
In Section 6, we present a Byzantine linearizable reliable broadcast algorithm with
resilience f < n2 , proving that, for this object, the resilience bound is tight. To do so, we
define a sequential specification of a reliable broadcast object. Briefly, the object exposes
broadcast and deliver operations and we require that deliver return messages previously
broadcast. We show that a Byzantine linearizable implementation of such an object satisfies
the classical (message-passing) definition [10]. Finally, in Section 7 we present a Byzantine
linearizable snapshot with the same resilience. In contrast, previous constructions of Byzantine
lattice agreement, which can be directly constructed from a snapshot [6], required 3f + 1
processes to tolerate f failures.
All in all, we establish a tight bound on the resilience of emulations of three useful shared
memory objects from registers. On the one hand, we show that it is impossible to obtain
wait-free solutions as in the non-Byzantine model, and on the other hand, unlike previous
snapshot and lattice agreement algorithms, our solutions do not require n > 3f . Taken
jointly, our results yield the following theorem:
▶ Theorem 1. In the Byzantine shared memory model, there exist n-process f-resilient
Byzantine linearizable implementations of reliable broadcast, snapshot, and asset transfer
objects from registers if and only if f < n2 .
Although the construction of reliable registers in message passing systems requires n > 3f
servers, our improved resilience applies to client processes, which are normally less reliable
than servers, particularly in the so-called permissioned model where servers are trusted and
clients are ephemeral.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
Formalizing Byzantine linearizability for any object with a sequential specification.
Proving that some of the most useful building blocks in distributed computing, such as
atomic snapshot and reliable broadcast, do not have f -resilient implementations from
SWMR registers when f ≥ n2 processes are Byzantine.
Presenting Byzantine linearizable implementations of a reliable broadcast object and a
snapshot object with the optimal resilience.
2 Related Work
In [4] Aguilera et al. present a non-equivocating broadcast algorithm in shared memory.
This broadcast primitive is weaker than reliable broadcast – it does not guarantee that all
correct processes deliver the same messages, but rather that they do not deliver conflicting
messages. A newer version of their work [5], developed concurrently and independently of
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our work1, also implements reliable broadcast with n ≥ 2f + 1, which is very similar to our
implementation. While the focus of their work is in the context of RDMA in the M&M
(message–and–memory) model, our work focuses on the classical shared memory model,
which can be emulated in classical message passing systems. While the algorithms are similar,
we formulate reliable broadcast as a shared memory object, with designated API method
signatures, which allows us to reason about the operation interval as needed for proving
(Byzantine) linearizability and for using this object in constructions of other shared memory
objects.
Given a reliable broadcast object, there are known implementations of lattice agree-
ment [16, 26], which resembles a snapshot object. However, these constructions require
n = 3f + 1 processes. In our work, we present both Byzantine linearizable reliable broadcast
and Byzantine snapshot, (from which Byzantine lattice agreement can be constructed [6]),
with resilience n = 2f + 1.
The asset transfer object we discuss in this paper was introduced by Guerraoui et
al. [17, 15]. Their work provides a formalization of the cryptocurrency definition [23]. The
highlight of their work is the observation that the asset transfer problem can be solved
without consensus. It is enough to maintain a partial order of transactions in the systems,
and in particular, every process can record its own transactions. They present a wait-free
linearizable implementation of asset transfer in crash-failure shared memory, taking advantage
of an atomic snapshot object. We show that we can use their solution, together with our
Byzantine snapshot, to solve Byzantine linearizable asset transfer with n = 2f + 1.
In addition, Guerraoui et al. present a Byzantine-tolerant solution in the message passing
model. This algorithm utilizes reliable broadcast, where dependencies of transactions are
explicitly broadcast along with the transactions. This solution does not translate to a
Byzantine linearizable one, but rather to a sequentially consistent asset transfer object. In
particular, reads can return old (superseded) values, and transfers may fail due to outdated
balance reads.
Finally, recent work by Auvolat et al. [7] continues this line of work. They show that a
FIFO order property between each pair of processes is sufficient in order to solve the asset
transfer problem. This is because transfer operations can be executed once a process’s balance
becomes sufficient to perform a transaction and there is no need to wait for all causally
preceding transactions. However, as a result, their algorithm is not sequentially consistent,
or even causally consistent for that matter. For example, assume process i maintains an
invariant that its balance is always at least 10, and performs a transfer with amount 5 after
another process deposits 5 into its account, increasing its balance to 15. Using the protocol
in [7], another process might observe i’s balance as 5 if it sees i’s outgoing transfer before the
causally preceding deposit. Because our solution is Byzantine linearizable, such anomalies
are prevented.
3 Model and Preliminaries
We study a distributed system in the shared memory model. Our system consists of a
well-known static set Π = {1, . . . , n} of asynchronous client processes. These processes have
access to some shared memory objects. In the shared memory model, all communication
between processes is done through the API exposed by the objects in the system: processes
invoke operations that in turn, return some response to the process. In this work, we assume
1 Their work [5] was in fact published shortly after the initial publication of our results [14].
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a reliable shared memory. (Previous works have presented constructions of such reliable
shared memory in the message passing model [1, 21, 24, 3, 19]). We further assume an
adversary that may adaptively corrupt up to f processes in the course of a run. When the
adversary corrupts a process, it is defined as Byzantine and may deviate arbitrarily from the
protocol. As long as a process is not corrupted by the adversary, it is correct, follows the
protocol, and takes infinitely many steps. In particular, it continues to invoke the object’s
API infinitely often. Later in the paper, we show that the latter assumption is necessary.
We enrich the model with a public key infrastructure (PKI). That is, every process is
equipped with a public-private key pair used to sign data and verify signatures of other
processes. We denote a value v signed by process i as ⟨v⟩i.
Executions and Histories. We discuss algorithms emulating some object O from lower level
objects (e.g., registers). An algorithm is organized as methods of O. A method execution is a
sequence of steps, beginning with the method’s invocation (invoke step), proceeding through
steps that access lower level objects (e.g., register read/write), and ending with a return step.
The invocation and response delineate the method’s execution interval. In an execution σ of
a Byzantine shared memory algorithm, each correct process invokes methods sequentially,
where steps of different processes are interleaved. Byzantine processes take arbitrary steps
regardless of the protocol. The history H of an execution σ is the sequence of high-level
invocation and response events of the emulated object O in σ.
A sub-history of a history H is a sub-sequence of the events of H. A history H is
sequential if it begins with an invocation and each invocation, except possibly the last, is
immediately followed by a matching response. Operation op is pending in a history H if op
is invoked in H but does not have a matching response event.
A history defines a partial order on operations: operation op1 precedes op2 in history H,
denoted op1 ≺H op2, if the response event of op1 precedes the invocation event of op2 in H.
Two operations are concurrent if neither precedes the other.
Linearizability. A popular correctness condition for concurrent objects in the crash-fault
model is linearizability [18], which is defined with respect to an object’s sequential specification.
A linearization of a concurrent history H of object o is a sequential history H ′ such that (1)
after removing some pending operations from H and completing others by adding matching
responses, it contains the same invocations and responses as H ′, (2) H ′ preserves the partial
order ≺H , and (3) H ′ satisfies o’s sequential specification.
f-resilient. An algorithm is f-resilient if as long as at most f processes fail, every correct
process eventually returns from each operation it invokes. A wait-free algorithm is a special
case where f = n− 1.
Single Writer Multiple Readers Register. The basic building block in shared memory is
a single writer multiple readers (SWMR) register that exposes read and write operations.
Such registers are used to construct more complicated objects. The sequential specification
of a SWMR register states that every read operation from register R returns the value last
written to R. Note that if the writer is Byzantine, it can cause a correct reader to read
arbitrary values.
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Asset Transfer Object. In [17, 15], the asset transfer problem is formulated as a sequential
object type, called Asset Transfer Object. The asset transfer object maintains a mapping
from processes in the system to their balances2. Initially, the mapping contains the initial
balances of all processes. The object exposes a transfer operation, transfer(src,dst,amount),
which can be invoked by process src (only). It withdraws amount from process src’s account
and deposits it at process dst’s account provided that src’s balance was at least amount. It
returns a boolean that states whether the transfer was successful (i.e., src had amount to
spend). In addition, the object exposes a read(i) operation that returns the current balance
of i.
4 Byzantine Linearizability
In this section we define Byzantine linearizability. Intuitively, we would like to tame the
Byzantine behavior in a way that provides consistency to correct processes. We linearize the
correct processes’ operations and offer a degree of freedom to embed additional operations
by Byzantine processes.
We denote by H|correct the projection of a history H to all correct processes. We say
that a history H is Byzantine linearizable if H|correct can be augmented with operations of
Byzantine processes such that the completed history is linearizable. That is, there is another
history, with the same operations by correct processes as in H, and additional operations by
another at most f processes. In particular, if there are no Byzantine failures then Byzantine
linearizability is simply linearizability. Formally:
▶ Definition 2 (Byzantine Linearizability). A history H is Byzantine linearizable if there
exists a history H ′ so that H ′|correct = H|correct and H ′ is linearizable.
Similarly to linearizability, we say that an object is Byzantine linearizable if all of its
executions are Byzantine Linearizable.
Next, we characterize objects for which Byzantine linearizability is meaningful. The
most fundamental component in shared memory is read-write registers. Not surprisingly,
such registers, whether they are single-writer or multi-writers ones are de facto Byzantine
linearizable without any changes. This is because before every read from a Byzantine register,
invoked by a correct process, one can add a corresponding Byzantine write.
In practice, multiple writers multiple readers (MWMR) registers are useless in a Byzantine
environment as an adversary that controls the scheduler can prevent any communication
between correct processes. SWMR registers, however, are still useful for constructing more
meaningful objects. Nevertheless, the constructions used in the crash-failure model for
linearizable objects do not preserve this property. For instance, if we allow Byzantine
processes to run a classic atomic snapshot algorithm [2] using Byzantine linearizable SWMR
registers, it will not result in a Byzantine linearizable snapshot object. The reason is that
the algorithm relies on correct processes being able to perform “double-collect” meaning that
at some point a correct process manages to read all registers twice without witnessing any
changes. While this is true in the crash-failure model, in the Byzantine model this is not the
case as the adversary can change some registers just before any correct read.
2 The definition in [17] allows processes to own multiple accounts. For simplicity, we assume a single
account per-process, as in [15].
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Relationship to Other Correctness Conditions
Byzantine linearizability provides a simple and intuitive way to capture Byzantine behavior
in the shared memory model. We now examine the relationship of Byzantine linearizability
with previously suggested correctness conditions involving Byzantine processes.
PBFT [12, 11] presented a formalization of linearizability in the presence of Byzantine-
faulty clients in message passing systems. Their notion of linearizability is formulated in the
form of I/O automata. Their specification is in the same spirit as ours, but our formulation
is closer to the original notion of linearizability in shared memory.
Some works have defined linearization conditions for specific objects. This includes
conditions for SWMR registers [22], a distributed ledger [13], and asset transfer [7]. Our
condition coincides with these definitions for the specific objects and thus generalizes all
of them. Liskov and Rodrigues [20] presented a correctness condition that has additional
restrictions. Their correctness notion relies on the idea that Byzantine processes are eventually
detected and removed from the system and focuses on converging to correct system behavior
after their departure. While this model is a good fit when the threat model is software
bugs or malicious intrusions, it is less appropriate for settings like cryptocurrencies, where
Byzantine behavior cannot be expected to eventually stop.
5 Lower Bound on Resilience
In shared memory, one typically aims for wait-free objects, which tolerate any number of
process failures. Indeed, many useful objects have wait-free implementations from SWMR
registers in the non-Byzantine case. This includes reliable broadcast, snapshots, and as
recently shown, also asset transfer. We now show that in the Byzantine case, wait-free
implementations of these objects are impossible. Moreover, a majority of correct processes is
required.
▶ Theorem 3. In the Byzantine shared memory model, for any f > 2, there does not exist a
Byzantine linearizable implementation of asset transfer that supports only transfer operations
in a system with n ≤ 2f processes, f of which can be Byzantine, using only SWMR registers.
Note that to prove this impossibility, it does not suffice to introduce bogus actions by
Byzantine processes, because the notion of Byzantine linearizability allows us to ignore these
actions. Rather, to derive the contradiction, we create runs where the bogus behavior of the
Byzantine processes leads to incorrect behavior of the correct processes.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there is such an algorithm. Let us look at a system with
n = 2f correct processes. Partition Π as follows: Π = A ∪B ∪ {p1, p2}, where |A| = f − 1,
|B| = f − 1, A ∩ B = ∅, and p1, p2 /∈ A ∪ B. By assumption, |A| > 1. Let z be a process
in A. Also, by assumption |B| ≥ 2. Let q1, q2 be processes in B. The initial balance of all
processes but z is 0, and the initial balance of z is 1. We construct four executions as shown
in Figure 1.
Let σ1 be an execution where, only processes in A ∪ {p1} take steps. First, z performs
transfer(z, p1,1). Since up to f processes may be faulty, the operation completes, and
by the object’s sequential specification, it is successful (returns true). Then, p1 performs
transfer(p1, q1,1). By f -resilience and linearizability, this operation also completes successfully.
Note that in σ1 no process is actually faulty, but because of f -resilience, progress is achieved
when f processes are silent.
Similarly, let σ2 be an execution where the processes in A ∪ {p2} are correct, and z
performs transfer(z, p2,1), followed by p2 performing transfer(p2, q2,1).
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Figure 1 An asset transfer object does not have an f -resilient implementation for n ≤ 2f .
We now construct σ3, where all processes in A∪{p1} are Byzantine. We first run σ1. Call
the time when it ends t1. At this point, all processes in A ∪ {p1} restore their registers to
their initial states. Note that no other processes took steps during σ1, hence the entire shared
memory is now in its initial state. Then, we execute σ2. Because we have reset the memory
to its initial state, the operations execute the same way. When σ2 completes, processes in
A\{z} ∪ {p1} restore their registers to their state at time t1. At this point, the state of z
and p2 is the same as it was at the end of σ2, the state of processes in A \ {z} ∪ {p1} is the
same as it was at the end of σ1, and processes in B are all in their initial states.
We construct σ4 where all processes in A ∪ {p2} are Byzantine by executing σ2, having
all processes in A ∪ {p2} reset their memory, executing σ1, and then having z and p2 restore
their registers to their state at the end of σ2. At this point, the state of z and p2 is the same
as it was at the end of σ2, the state of processes in A \ {z} ∪ {p1} is the same as it was at
the end of σ1, and processes in B are all in their initial states.
We observe that for processes in B, the configurations at the end of σ3 and σ4 are
indistinguishable as they did not take any steps and the global memory is the same. By
f -resilience, in both cases q1 and q2, together with processes in B and one of {p1, p2} should
be able to make progress at the end of each of these runs. We extend the runs by having q1
and q2 invoke transfers of amount 1 to each other. In both runs processes in B∪{p1, p2} help
them make progress. In σ3, p1 behaves as if it is a correct process and its local state is the
same as it is at the end of σ1, and in σ4 p2 behaves as if it is a correct process and its local
state is the same as it is at the end of σ2. Thus, σ3 and σ4 are indistinguishable to all correct
processes, and as a result q1 and q2 act the same in both runs. However, from safety exactly
one of their transfers should succeed. In σ3, p2 is correct and transfer(p2, q2,1) succeeds,
allowing q2 to transfer 1 and disallowing the transfer from q1, whereas σ4 the opposite is
true. This is a contradiction. ◀
Guerraoui et al. [17] use an atomic snapshot to implement an asset transfer object in
the crash-fault shared memory model. In addition, they handle Byzantine processes in the
message passing model by taking advantage of reliable broadcast. In Appendix A we show
that their atomic snapshot-based asset transfer can be easily adapted to the Byzantine
settings by using a Byzantine linearizable snapshot, resulting in a Byzantine linearizable asset
transfer. Their reliable broadcast-based algorithm, on the other hand, is not linearizable
and therefore not Byzantine linearizable even when using Byzantine linearizable reliable
broadcast. Nonetheless, Auvolat et al. [7] have used reliable broadcast to construct an asset
transfer object where transfer operations are linearizable (although reads are not).
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We note that our lower bound holds for an asset transfer object without read operations.
In Algorithm 4 in Appendix A we construct an asset transfer object given a Byzantine
linearizable snapshot (proofs appear in the full version [14]). The above discussion and the
construction in Algorithm 4 lead us to the following corollary:
▶ Corollary 4. In the Byzantine shared memory model, for any f > 2, there does not exist an
f -resilient Byzantine linearizable implementation of an atomic snapshot or reliable broadcast
in a system with f ≥ n2 Byzantine processes using only SWMR registers.
Furthermore, we prove in the following lemma that in order to provide f -resilience it is
required that at least a majority of correct processes take steps infinitely often, justifying
our model definition.
▶ Lemma 5. In the Byzantine shared memory model, for any f > 2, there does not exist an
f -resilient Byzantine linearizable implementation of asset transfer in a system with n ≥ 2f +1
processes, f of which can be Byzantine, using only SWMR registers if less than f + 1 correct
processes take steps infinitely often.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that there exists an f -resilient Byzantine linearizable
implementation of asset transfer in a system with n ≥ 2f + 1 processes where there are at
most f correct processes that take steps infinitely often. Denote these f correct processes by
the set A. Thus, there is a point t in any execution such that from time t, only processes
in A and Byzantine processes take any steps. Starting t, the implementation is equivalent
to one in a system with n = 2f , f of them may be Byzantine. This is a contradiction
to Theorem 3. ◀
6 Byzantine Linearizable Reliable Broadcast
With the acknowledgment that not all is possible, we seek to find Byzantine linearizable
objects that are useful even without a wait-free implementation. One of the practical objects
is a reliable broadcast object. We already proved in the previous section that it does not
have an f -resilient Byzantine linearizable implementation, for any f ≥ max{3, n2 }. In this
section we provide an implementation that tolerates f < n2 faults.
6.1 Reliable Broadcast Object
The reliable broadcast primitive exposes two operations broadcast(ts,m) returning void and
deliver(j,ts) returning m. When deliverj(i, ts) returns m we say that process j delivers m
from process i in timestamp ts. The broadcast operation allows processes to spread a message
m in the system, along with some timestamp ts. The use of timestamps allows processes to
broadcast multiple messages.
Its classical definition, given for message passing systems [10], requires the following
properties:
Validity: If a correct process i broadcasts (ts, m) then all correct processes eventually
deliver m from process i in timestamp ts.
Agreement: If a correct process delivers m from process i in timestamp ts, then all correct
processes eventually deliver m from process i in timestamp ts.
Integrity: No process delivers two different messages for the same (ts, j) and if j is correct
delivers only messages j previously broadcast.
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In the shared memory model, the deliver operation for some process j and timestamp ts
returns the message with timestamp ts previously broadcast by j, if exists. We define the
sequential specification of reliable broadcast as follows:
▶ Definition 6. A reliable broadcast object exposes two operations broadcast(ts,m) returning
void and deliver(j,ts) returning m. A call to deliver(j,ts) returns the value m of the first
broadcast(ts,m) invoked by process j before the deliver operation. If j did not invoke broadcast
before the deliver, then it returns ⊥.
Note that as the definition above refers to sequential histories, the first broadcast operation
(if such exists) is well-defined. Further, whereas in message passing systems reliable broadcast
works in a push fashion, where the receipt of a message triggers action at its destination,
in the shared memory model processes need to actively pull information from the registers.
A process pulls from another process j using the deliver(j,ts) operation and returns with
a value m ̸= ⊥. If all messages are eventually pulled, the reliable broadcast properties are
achieved, as proven in the following lemma.
▶ Lemma 7. A Byzantine linearization of a reliable broadcast object satisfies the three
properties of reliable broadcast.
Proof. If a correct process broadcasts m, and all messages are subsequently pulled then
according to Definition 6 all correct processes deliver m, providing validity. For agreement, if
a correct process invokes deliver(j,ts) that returns m and all messages are later pulled by all
correct processes, it follows that all correct processes also invoke deliver(j,ts) and eventually
return m′ ̸= ⊥. Since deliver(j,ts) returns the value v of the first broadcast(ts,v) invoked by
process j before it is called, and there is only one first broadcast, and we get that m = m′.
Lastly, if deliver(j,ts) returns m, by the specification, j previously invoked broadcast(ts,m).
◀
6.2 Reliable Broadcast Algorithm
In our implementation (given in Algorithm 1), each process has 4 SWMR registers: send,
echo, ready, and deliver, to which we refer as stages of the broadcast. We follow concepts
from Bracha’s implementation in the message passing model [9] but leverage the shared
memory to improve its resilience from 3f + 1 to 2f + 1. The basic idea is that a process
that wishes to broadcast value v writes it in its send register (line 4) and returns only when
it reaches the deliver stage. I.e., v appears in the deliver register of at least one correct
process. Throughout the run, processes infinitely often call a refresh function whose role is
to help the progress of the system. When refreshing, processes read all registers and help
promote broadcast values through the 4 stages. For a value to be delivered, it has to have
been read and signed by f + 1 processes at the ready stage. Because each broadcast message
is copied to 4 registers of each process, the space complexity is 4n per message. Whether
this complexity can be improved remains as an open question.
In the refresh function, executed for all processes, at first a process reads the last value
written to a send register (line 16). If the value is a signed pair of a message and a timestamp,
refresh then copies it to the process’s echo register in line 18. In the echo register, the value
remains as evidence, preventing conflicting values (sent by Byzantine processes) from being
delivered. That is, before promoting a value to the ready or deliver stage, a correct process i
performs a “double-collect” of the echo registers (in lines 19,21). Namely, after collecting
f + 1 signatures on a value in ready registers, meaning that it was previously written in the
echo of at least one correct process, i re-reads all echo registers to verify that there does
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not exist a conflicting value (with the same timestamp and sender). Using this method,
concurrent deliver operations “see” each other, and delivery of conflicting values broadcast
by a Byzantine process is prevented. Before delivering a value, a process writes it to its
deliver register with f + 1 signatures (line 22). Once one correct process delivers a value, the
following deliver calls can witness the f + 1 signatures and copy this value directly from its
deliver register (line 11).
Algorithm 1 Shared Memory Bracha: code for process i.
shared SWMR registers: sendi, echoi, readyi, deliveri
1: procedure conflicting-echo(⟨ts, v⟩j)
2: return ∃w ̸= v, k ∈ Π such that ⟨ts, w⟩j ∈ echok
3: procedure broadcast(ts,val)
4: sendi ← ⟨ts, val⟩i
5: repeat
6: m← deliver(i,ts)
7: until m ̸= ⊥ ▷ message is deliverable
8: procedure deliver(j,ts)
9: refresh()
10: if ∃k ∈ Π and v s.t. ⟨⟨ts, v⟩j , σ⟩ ∈ deliverk where σ is a set of f + 1 signatures on
⟨ready, ⟨ts, v⟩j⟩ then




15: for j ∈ [n] do
16: m← sendj
17: if ∄ts, val s.t. m = ⟨ts, val⟩j then continue ▷ m is not a signed pair
18: echoi ← echoi ∪ {m}
19: if ¬conflicting-echo(m) then
20: readyi ← readyi ∪ {⟨ready, m⟩i}
21: if ∃S ⊆ Π s.t. |S| ≥ f + 1, ∀j ∈ S, ⟨ready, m⟩j ∈ readyj and ¬conflicting-echo(m)
then
22: deliveri ← deliveri ∪ {⟨m, σ = {⟨ready, m⟩j |j ∈ S}⟩} ▷ σ is the set of f + 1
signatures
We make two assumptions on the correct usage of our algorithm. The first is inherently
required as shown in Lemma 5:
▶ Assumption 1. All correct processes infinitely often invoke methods of the reliable broadcast
API.
The second is a straight forward validity assumption:
▶ Assumption 2. Correct processes do not invoke broadcast(ts,val) twice with the same ts.
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In the full version [14] we prove the correctness of the reliable broadcast algorithm and
conclude the following theorem:
▶ Theorem 8. Algorithm 1 implements an f -resilient Byzantine linearizable reliable broadcast
object for any f < n2 .
7 Byzantine Linearizable Snapshot
In this section, we utilize a reliable broadcast primitive to construct a Byzantine snapshot
object with resilience n > 2f .
7.1 Snapshot Object
A snapshot [2] is represented as an array of n shared single-writer variables that can be
accessed with two operations: update(v), called by process i, updates the ith entry in the
array and snapshot returns an array. The sequential specification of an atomic snapshot is as
follows: the ith entry of the array returned by a snapshot invocation contains the value v
last updated by an update(v) invoked by process i, or its variable’s initial value if no update
was invoked.
Following Lemma 5, we again must require that correct processes perform operations
infinitely often. For simplicity, we require that they invoke infinitely many snapshot operations;
if processes invoke either snapshots or updates, we can have each update perform a snapshot
and ignore its result.
▶ Assumption 3. All correct processes invoke snapshot operations infinitely often.
7.2 Snapshot Algorithm
Our pseudo-code is presented in Algorithms 2 and 3. During the algorithm, we compare
snapshots using the (partial) coordinate-wise order. That is, let s1 and s2 be two n-arrays.
We say that s2 > s1 if ∀i ∈ [n], s2[i].ts > s1[i].ts.
Recall that all processes invoke snapshot operations infinitely often. In each snapshot
instance, correct processes start by collecting values from all registers and broadcasting their
collected arrays in “start” messages (message with timestamp 0). Then, they repeatedly
send the identities of processes from which they delivered start messages until there exists
a round such that the same set of senders is received from f + 1 processes in that round.
Once this occurs, it means that the f + 1 processes see the exact same start messages and
the snapshot is formed as the supremum of the collects in their start messages.
We achieve optimal resilience by waiting for only f + 1 processes to send the same set.
Although there is not necessarily a correct process in the intersection of two sets of size f + 1,
we leverage the fact that reliable broadcast prevents equivocation to ensure that nevertheless,
there is a common message in the intersection, so two snapshots obtained in the same round
are necessarily identical. Moreover, once one process obtains a snapshot s, any snapshot seen
in a later round exceeds s.
Each process i collects values from all processes’ registers in a shared variable collecti.
When starting a snapshot operation, each process runs update-collect, where it updates its
collect array (line 8) and saves it in a local variable c (line 9). When it does so, it updates the
ith entry to be the highest-timestamped value it observes in the ith entries of all processes’
collect arrays (lines 16 – 18). Then, it initiates the snapshot-aux procedure with a new
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Algorithm 2 Byzantine Snapshot: code for process i.
shared SWMR registers: ∀j ∈ [n] collectedi[j] ∈ {⊥} ∪ {N× V als} with selectors ts and
val, initially ⊥
∀k ∈ N, savesnapi[k] ∈ {⊥} ∪ {array of n V als × set of messages} with selectors snap
and proof, initially ⊥
local variables: tsi ∈ N, initially 0
∀j ∈ [n], rtsi[j] ∈ N, initially 0
r, auxnum ∈ N, initially 0
p ∈ [n], initially 1
∀j ∈ [n], k ∈ N, seeni[j][k],sendersi ∈ P(Π), initially ∅
σ ← ∅ set of messages
1: procedure update(v)
2: for j ∈ [n] do ▷ collect current memory state
3: update-collect(collectedj)
4: tsi ← tsi + 1
5: collectedi[i]← ⟨tsi, v⟩i ▷ update local component of collected
6: procedure snapshot




11: auxnum← auxnum + 1
12: snap← snapshot-aux(auxnum)
13: until snap ≥ c ▷ snapshot is newer than the collected state
14: return snap
15: procedure update-collect(c)
16: for k ∈ [n] do
17: if c[k].ts > collectedi[k].ts and c[k] is signed by k then
18: collectedi[k]← c[k]
auxnum tag. Snapshot-aux returns a snapshot, but not necessarily a “fresh” one that reflects
all updates that occurred before snapshot was invoked. Therefore, snapshot-aux is repeatedly
called until it collects a snapshot s such that s ≥ c, according to the snapshots partial order
(lines 10 – 13).
By Assumption 3 and since the auxnum variable at each correct process is increased
by 1 every time snapshot-aux is called, all correct processes participate in all instances
of snapshot-aux. When a correct process invokes a snapshot-aux procedure with auxnum,
it first initiates a new reliable broadcast instance at line 28, dedicated to this instance
of snapshot-aux. Note that although processes invoke one snapshot-aux at a time, they
may engage in multiple reliable broadcast instances simultaneously. That is, they continue
to partake in previous reliable broadcast instances after starting a new one. As another
preliminary step of snapshot-aux, each correct process once again updates its collect array
using the update-collect procedure (lines 30– 31) and broadcasts it to all processes at line 33.
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Algorithm 3 Byzantine Snapshot auxiliary procedures: code for process i.
19: procedure minimum-saved(auxnum)
20: S ← {s|∃j ∈ [n], s = savesnapj [auxnum].snap and savesnapj [auxnum].proof is a valid
proof of s}
21: if S = ∅ then
22: return ⊥







28: initiate new reliable broadcast instance
29: σ ← ∅
30: for j ∈ [n] do ▷ collect current memory state
31: update-collect(collectedj)
32: sendersi ← {i} ▷ start message contains collect
33: broadcast(0,⟨collecti⟩i)
34: while true do
35: cached← minimum-saved(auxnum) ▷ check if there is a saved snapshot
36: if cached ̸= ⊥ then return cached
37: p← (p + 1) mod n + 1 ▷ deliver messages in round robin
38: m← deliver(p, rtsi[p]) ▷ deliver next message from p
39: if m = ⊥ then continue
40: if rtsi[p]= 0 and m contains a signed collect array c then
▷ start message (round 0)
41: σ ← σ ∪ {m}
42: update-collect(c)
43: sendersi ← sendersi ∪ {j}
44: else if m contains a signed set of processes, jsenders then
▷ round r message for r > 0
45: if jsenders ⊈ sendersi then
46: continue ▷ cannot process message, its dependencies are missing
47: σ ← σ ∪ {m}
48: seeni[j][rtsi[p]]← jsenders ∪ seeni[j][rtsi[p]− 1]
49: rtsi[p]← rtsi[p] + 1
50: if received f + 1 round-r messages for the first time then
51: r ← r + 1
52: broadcast(r, ⟨sendersi⟩i)
53: if ∃s s.t. |{j| seeni[j][s] = sendersi}| = f + 1 then ▷ stability condition
54: r ← 0
55: sendersi← ∅
56: ∀j ∈ [n], k ∈ N, seeni[j][k]← ∅
57: cached← minimum-saved(auxnum) ▷ re-check for saved snapshot
58: if cached ̸= ⊥ then return cached
59: savesnapi[auxnum]← ⟨collecti, σ⟩
▷ σ contains all received messages in this snapshot-aux instance
60: return collecti
DISC 2021
18:14 Tame the Wild with Byzantine Linearizability
During the execution, a correct processes delivers messages from all other processes in a
round robin fashion. The local variable p represents the process from which it currently
delivers. In addition, rts[p] maintains the next timestamp to be delivered from p (lines 38,
49, 37). Note that if the delivered message at some point is ⊥, rts[p] is not increased, so all
of p’s messages are delivered in order (line 39).
Snapshot-aux proceeds in rounds, which are reflected in the timestamps of the messages
broadcast during its execution. Each correct process starts snapshot-aux at round 0, where
it broadcasts its collected array; we refer to this as its start message. It then continues to
round r + 1 once it has delivered f + 1 round r messages (line 51). Each process maintains a
local set senders that contains the processes from which it received start messages (line 43).
In every round (from 1 onward) processes send the set of processes from which they received
start messages (line 52).
Process i maintains a local map seen[j][r] that maps a process j and a round r to the set
of processes that j reported to have received start messages from in rounds 1–r (line 48), but
only if i has received start messages from all the reported processes (line 45). By doing so,
we ensure that if for some correct process i and a round r seeni[j][r] contains a process l, l
is also in sendersi. If this condition is not satisfied, the delivered counter for j (rts[j]) is not
increased and this message will be repeatedly delivered until the condition is satisfied.
Once there is a process i such that there exists a round s and there is a set S of f + 1
processes j for which seeni[j][s] is equal to sendersi, we say that the stability condition
at line 53 is satisfied for S. At that time, i and f more processes agree on the collected
arrays sent at round 0 by processes in sendersi, and collecti holds the supremum of those
collected arrays. This is because whenever it received a start message, it updated its collect
so that currently collecti reflects all collects sent by processes in sendersi. Thus, i can return
its current collect as the snapshot-aux result. Since reliable broadcast prevents Byzantine
processes from equivocating, there are f more processes that broadcast the same senders
set at that round, and any future round will “see” this set. As we later show, after at most
n + 1 rounds, the stability condition holds and hence the size of seen is O(n3). Together
with the collected arrays, the total space complexity is cubic in n.
To ensure liveness in case some correct processes complete a snapshot-aux instance before
all do, we add a helping mechanism. Whenever a correct process successfully completes
snapshot-aux, it stores its result in a savesnap map, with the auxnum as the key (either at
line 24 or at line 59). This way, once one correct process returns from snapshot-aux, others
can read its result at line 35 and return as well. To prevent Byzantine processes from storing
invalid snapshots, each entry in the savesnap map is a tuple of the returned array and a proof
of the array’s validity. The proof is the set of messages received by the process that stores
its array in the current instance of snapshot-aux. Using these messages, correct processes
can verify the legitimacy of the stored array. If a correct process reads from savesnap a tuple
with an invalid proof, it simply ignores it.
7.3 Correctness
We outline the key correctness arguments highlighting the main lemmas. Formal proofs of
these lemmas appear in the full version [14]. To prove our algorithm is Byzantine linearizable,
we first show that all returned snapshots are totally ordered (by coordinate-wise order):
▶ Lemma 9. If two snapshot operations invoked by correct processes return si and sj, then
sj ≥ si or sj < si.
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Based on this order, we define a linearization. Then, we show that our linearization
preserves real-time order, and it respects the sequential specification. We construct the
linearization E as follows: First, we linearize all snapshot operations of correct processes
in the order of their return values. Then, we linearize every update operation by a correct
process immediately before the first snapshot operation that “sees” it. We say that a snapshot
returning s sees an update by process j that has timestamp ts if s[j].ts ≥ ts. If multiple
updates are linearized to the same point (before the same snapshot), we order them by their
start times. Finally, we add updates by Byzantine processes as follows: We add update(v) by
a Byzantine process j if there is a linearized snapshot that returns s and s[j].val = v. We
add the update immediately before any snapshot that sees it.
We next prove that the linearization respects the sequential specification.
▶ Lemma 10. The ith entry of the array returned by a snapshot invocation contains the
value v last updated by an update(v) invoked by process i in E, or its variable’s initial value
if no update was invoked.
Because an update is linearized immediately before some snapshot sees it and snapshots
are monotonically increasing, all following snapshots see the update as well. Next, we prove
in the two following lemmas that E preserves the real-time order.
▶ Lemma 11. If a snapshot operation invoked by a correct process i with return value si
precedes a snapshot operation invoked by a correct process j with return value sj , then si ≤ sj .
▶ Lemma 12. Let s be the return value of a snapshot operation snapi invoked by a correct
process i. Let updatej(v) be an update operation invoked by a correct process j that writes
⟨ts, v⟩ and completes before snapi starts. Then, s[j].ts ≥ ts.
It follows from Lemma 12 and the definition of E, that if an update precedes a snapshot
it is linearized before it, and from Lemma 11 that if a snapshot precedes a snapshot it is also
linearized before it. The following lemma ensures that if an update precedes another update
it is linearized before it. That is, if a snapshot operation sees the second update, it sees the
first one.
▶ Lemma 13. If update1 by process i precedes update2 by process j and a snapshot operation
snap by a correct process sees update2, then snap sees update1 as well.
Finally, the next lemma proves the liveness of our algorithm.
▶ Lemma 14. (Liveness) Every correct process that invokes some operation eventually
returns.
We conclude the following theorem:
▶ Theorem 15. Algorithm 2 implements an f -resilient Byzantine linearizable snapshot object
for any f < n2 .
Proof. Lemma 9 shows that there is a total order on snapshot operations. Using this order,
we have defined a linearization E that satisfies the sequential specification (Lemma 10). We
then proved that E also preserves real-time order (Lemmas 11 – 13). Thus, Algorithm 2 is
Byzantine linearizable. In addition, Lemma 14 proves that Algorithm 2 is f -resilient. ◀
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8 Conclusions
We have studied shared memory constructions in the presence of Byzantine processes. To
this end, we have defined Byzantine linearizability, a correctness condition suitable for shared
memory algorithms that can tolerate Byzantine behavior. We then used this notion to present
both upper and lower bounds on some of the most fundamental components in distributed
computing.
We proved that atomic snapshot, reliable broadcast, and asset transfer are all problems
that do not have f -resilient emulations from registers when n ≤ 2f . On the other hand,
we have presented an algorithm for Byzantine linearizable reliable broadcast with resilience
n > 2f . We then used it to implement a Byzantine snapshot with the same resilience.
Among other applications, this Byzantine snapshot can be utilized to provide a Byzantine
linearizable asset transfer. Thus, we proved a tight bound on the resilience of emulations of
asset transfer, snapshot, and reliable broadcast.
Our paper deals with feasibility results and does not focus on complexity measures. In
particular, we assume unbounded storage in our constructions. We leave the subject of
efficiency as an open question for future work.
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A Byzantine Asset Transfer
In this section we adapt the asset transfer implementation from snapshots given in [17] to a
Byzantine asset transfer. The algorithm is very simple. It is based on a shared snapshot array
S, with a cell for each client process i, representing i’s outgoing transactions. An additional
immutable array holds all processes’ initial balances. A process i’s balance is computed by
taking a snapshot of S and applying all of i’s valid incoming and outgoing transfers to i’s
initial balance. A transfer invoked by process i checks if i’s balance is sufficient, and if so,
appends the transfer details (source, destination, and amount) to i’s cell. Similarly to the
use of dependencies in the (message-passing broadcast-based) asset transfer algorithm of [17],
we also track the history of every transaction. To this end, we append to the process’s cell
also the snapshot taken to compute the balance for each transaction.
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Algorithm 4 Byzantine Asset Transfer: code for process i.
shared Byzantine snapshot: S
initial– immutable array of initial balances
local variables: txnsi – sets of outgoing transaction, initially {}
tsi ∈ N, initially 0








2: incoming ← 0
3: outgoing ← 0
4: for l ∈ [n] do
5: for k ∈ snap[l] do
6: if snap[l][k].dst = j and valid(snap[l][k]) then
7: incoming ← incoming + snap[l][k].amount
8: for k ∈ snap[j] do
9: if valid(snap[j][k]) then
10: outgoing ← outgoing + snap[j][k].amount
11: return initial(j) + incoming − outgoing
12: procedure transfer(src,dst,amount)
13: tsi ← tsi + 1
14: snap← S.snapshot()
15: if balance(src, snap) < amount then
16: return false





22: return balance(j, snap)
